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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

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STATE review(s) completed.

8 September 1966

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*Communist China - US: The official Chinese statement at the Warsaw meeting yesterday broke no new ground on any substantive issue and was no harsher than is usual at these talks.

The Chinese attempted to justify their unprecedented public release of material from the confidential Warsaw talks by charging that the US had "leaked" information concerning previous meetings. Peking, however, does not wish to break off this contact with the US, and Ambassador Wang proposed 11 January 1967 as the date for the next discussion. This gap is about as long as that since the last meeting, which took place in May.

Although uncompromising in language, Wang's declaration at the 131st meeting advanced no new propositions, and did nothing more than restate positions put forward repeatedly by Peking in propaganda statements during the past year. The US ambassador reports that, despite the abusive terms used by the Chinese, the over-all atmosphere at the meeting was relaxed and Wang did not appear at any time agitated or excited.

Wang attacked the US 'peace talks swindle' and belabored the Soviet Union for alleged collaboration with the US. He reiterated Peking's adamant opposition to negotiations on Vietnam and asserted once again that China--'the great rear area"--would support Hanoi's struggle against the US to the end.

Peking's motivation in releasing Wang's statement to the press is not entirely clear but the information available at this time suggests the Chinese hoped in this way to give new weight to old

statements which had lost their impact through constant repetition. The remarks concerning negotiations on Vietnam were probably intended as a reply to recent US statements concerning mutual de-escalation of the war by both sides, designed to encourage Hanoi-which has already attacked the concept--to stand firm in the struggle.

Release of the statement could also serve to nip in the bud any speculation that the comparatively moderate and reasonable remarks concerning Sino-US relations by Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi signaled a shift in Chinese policy with regard to Vietnam. When the US ambassador pointed out the contrast between Chen Yi's and the hard tone of Wang's statement, the Chinese ambassador acted surprised. He did not respond at once but at the end of the meeting reiterated Peking's determination with regard to Vietnam and asserted that the statement he had just made represented the "view of the Chinese people."

Chen's reported remarks, presented in a long-run context, were probably intended to counteract fears aroused by bellicose statements emanating from the Red Guards. He declared that not every demand by the Guards would be taken as national policy and stated specifically that Peking's foreign policy will not be changed by the "cultural revolution."

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Colombia: President Lleras is prevailing in his confrontation with Communist student agitators. Only a few students in Medellin remain on strike, the planned "occupation" of universities has failed, and non-Communist students now are making their weight felt in opposition to the Communist-dominated National Students' Federation. Lleras' success is likely to lessen student agitation and raise the prestige of his administration.

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